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ABSTRACT
As concern over hate speech grows into a global issue (Haraszti 2012), a recurring 
question confronting every democratic society is how it should restrict a discriminatory 
speech without infringing upon the universally accepted principle of free speech. Japan’s 
recent experience in coping with growing hate speech presents a valuable case study. 
The country had staunchly protected the free speech principle enshrined in the post-World 
War II constitution and consistently been disinclined to pass any law that regulated hate 
speech. This, however, has changed dramatically in the last few years. The incidence of 
hate speech targeting ethnic Koreans exploded around 2012, which in turn set in motion 
a tidal wave of vibrant anti-racism movements. This article examines the relevance 
of sociological implications of critical race theory, a legal movement that has featured 
prominently in the anti-racist practice in the United States, in understanding the recent 
emergence of anti-hate speech activism in Japan.1
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ABSTRAK
Tatkala keprihatinan akan ujaran kebencian menjadi masalah global (Haraszti 2012), 
pertanyaan yang mengusik setiap masyarakat demokratis adalah bagaimana ia 
harus membatasi ujaran kebencian tanpa melanggar asas kebebasan berpendapat. 
Pengalaman Jepang menghadapi ujaran kebencian yang merajalela menjadi studi 
kasus yang berharga. Negara itu secara gigih mempertahankan asas kebebasan 
berpendapat yang telah dicanangkan dalam konstitusi dan menolak membuat undang-
undang yang mengatur ujaran kebencian. Namun, keadaan telah berubah drastis dalam 
beberapa tahun terakhir ini. Insiden ujaran kebencian yang menyasar warga etnik Korea 
meledak di sekitar tahun 2012 dan kejadian itu mengundang gelombang besar gerakan 
antirasisme yang penuh semangat. Artikel ini mengkaji relevansi implikasi sosiologis teori 
ras kritis, sebuah gerakan ilmu hukum yang mewarnai antirasisme di Amerika Serikat, 
1 Shiohara (2013; 2017) notes that academic discussion of hate speech in Japan has focused primarily on the issue of a hate 
speech regulation from a legal perspective.  
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dalam memahami kebangkitan aktivisme antiujaran kebencian di Jepang. Kajian ini juga 
memberikan gambaran sosiologis mengenai munculnya ujaran kebencian anti-Korea di 
Jepang, sebuah topik yang selama ini didominasi oleh argumen-argumen hukum tentang 
masalah konstitusionalitas pembatasan ujaran kebencian.
KATA KUNCI
Ujaran kebencian; teori ras kritis; konstruksionisme sosial, konvergensi kepentingan, 
Jepang.
1. INTRODUCTION2
As Maussen and Grillo (2014, 175) point out that finding ways of addressing the problem of hate speech 
while maintaining free speech is “one of the major challenges facing democratic societies.” Countries have 
coped with spiteful speeches with varying courses of action, including 1) the “minimalist” approach of the 
United States, which prioritizes the freedom of speech over every form of speech restriction including the 
hate speech regulation, and 2) the ‘regulationist’ stance exemplified by the European Union, which warrants 
a certain level of regulation of hate speech on the grounds that the latter will inevitably lead to the dismantling 
of democracy, pluralism, and diversity (Haraszti 2012; Maussen and Grillo 2014).
Ethnically discriminatory hate speech aimed at resident Koreans has existed in Japan for some time, 
but its incidence skyrocketed around 2012 amid the country’s deteriorating relationship with South Korea 
(Duetsche Well 2013; Sato 2013). Inflammatory demonstrations by anti-Korean activist groups have risen 
sharply since then, many of which involved racial invectives against ethnic minorities. 
At the height of this rising racism, a new counter-protest movement was born, whose main activity 
involved tracking down xenophobic rallies and staging opposing demonstrations characterized by equally 
incendiary language. The movement’s provocative methods raised a few eyebrows, but its straightforward 
messages were instrumental in raising public consciousness regarding the presence of noxious discriminatory 
speech in Japan. 
Furthermore, as reported by the Japan Times (2016), “In [August] 2014, the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination urged the Japanese government to regulate hate speech by law,” which 
led to the ascendancy of anti-hate speech activism in Japan, the most significant outcome of which was the 
passage of the very first hate speech elimination law by the Diet in May 2016. 
The following sections present a detailed account of these processes and examine the sociological 
implications of critical race theory in understanding them. This study employs library research methods in 
collecting the relevant data concerning the outbreak of anti-Korean hate speech 2012-2015, the emergence 
of anti-racism movements, hate speech elimination legislation and its effects, as well as the theoretical 
perspectives for analyzing them, from both English and Japanese sources. 
2. Definitions of Hate Speech   
The term “hate speech” as we know it today has undergone a long process of refinement. Cortese (2006, 3) 
points out that before the 1980s, “hate” merely referred to “any intense dislike or hostility whatever its object 
2 The draft version of this article (Alam 2016), with entirely different theoretical discussion, was presented at the International 
Symposium “Half a Century of Japanese Studies in Indonesia: Reflecting the Past, Envisioning the Future,” organized by the 
Indonesian Association for Japanese Studies (ASJI), 27-28 October 2016, and published in Indonesian as Alam (2017).
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... Hate, in this generic sense, could be directed at virtually anything—a person, a group, an idea, some other 
abstraction, or an inanimate object.” However, after the mid-1980s, “hate” began to be utilized “in a much 
more restricted sense to characterize an individual’s negative belief and especially about the members of 
some other category of people based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or physical 
or mental disability.” As a result, “this more limited use overlaps with prejudice, bigotry, racism, misogyny, 
homophobia, ageism, bias, and xenophobia (Ibid.).”
Today, one of the widely used definitions of spiteful speech is offered by the Committee of Ministers – 
Council of Europe (1997), which in its 1997 recommendation formulates the concept from a primarily racial, 
ethnic, national perspective as follows:
The term “hate speech” shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, 
incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based 
on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, 
discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.
More recently, Maussen and Grillo (2014, 175) suggest that while “[i]n legal practice, a precise 
definition of ‘hate speech’ may be preferable . . . in other contexts more inclusive notions can be used.” They 
submit that in a social and political analysis the term “hate speech” should include “a wide range of forms of 
expression (oral or written) which may include pictorial and other kinds of representation, including symbols 
and signs, for example the ‘Heil Hitler!’ salute, or dress codes that express political sympathies (Ibid.)”. 
Maussen and Grillo (Ibid.) further identify “three essential features of hate speech.” First, “it is directed 
against a specified or easily identifiable individual or, more usually, group of individuals based on aspects of 
their (core, non-voluntary) identity.” Second, “it stigmatizes the target group by implicitly or explicitly ascribing 
qualities widely regarded as highly undesirable.” Third, “because of its negative qualities, the target group 
is viewed as an unwelcome presence and a legitimate object of hostility.” The core, non-voluntary identity 
mentioned in this inclusive definition, clearly refers to such deeply personal attributes as race, ethnicity, 
nationality and religion as well as gender, age, disability, sexual orientation etc. For the purpose of this study, 
the inclusive definition of hate speech is used throughout this article. 
3. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: BASIC TENETS
One of the theoretical perspectives that sanction hate speech regulation is critical race theory. The early 
pioneer of the theory, Mari Matsuda (Matsuda et al. 1993, 18), wrote that its origin can be traced back to 
the late 1970s, when “[t]he civil rights movement of the 1960 had stalled, and many of its gains were being 
rolled back ... [i]ndividual law teachers and students committed to racial justice began to meet, to talk, to 
write and to engage in political action in an effort to confront and oppose dominant societal and institutional 
forces that maintained the structures of racism while professing the goal of dismantling racial discrimination.” 
While critical race theory is largely referred to as a “movement” that engages “in studying and transforming 
the relationship among race, racism, and power (Delgado and Stefancic 2017, 3),” it does offer a number of 
theoretical perspectives for socio-political analysis of hate speech. 
Among scores of its basic tenets (Ibid., 8–11)—ordinariness of racism, differential racialization, 
intersectionality, and antiessentialism, to name a few—the most relevant ones to this study are social 
constructionism and interest convergence. Social constructionism implies that racial, ethnic, gender, sexual, 
and other forms of discrimination are not solely occasioned by personal prejudice and decision making, but 
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rather informed by larger, systemic, structural, and cultural forces operating on psychological and communal 
levels of individual lives (Ibid.). 
Interest convergence, a notion that the majority “will support minority rights only when it is also in 
their interest (Oremus 2012),” was proposed by Derrick Bell, one of the legal scholars who propounded the 
term “critical race theory” in the 1970s. As pointed out by Oremus (2012), Bell (1980) presents an audacious 
hypothesis in his historical article that “the US Supreme Court’s landmark 1954 school-desegregation 
decision, Brown v. Board of Education... [was] a part of a Cold War effort to improve America’s standing 
among Third World countries.” He theorizes that “world and domestic considerations—not moral qualms 
over blacks’ plight—precipitated the path-breaking decision (Delgado and Stefancic 2017, 22).” This bold 
hypothesis was later proved to be largely correct by Dudziak (2000), who demonstrated in her archival study 
that the US Justice Department did “intervene on the side of the NAACP3... responding to a flood of secret 
cables and memos outlining the United States’ interest in improving its image in the eyes of the Third World” 
(Ibid., 23–24).   
 Armed with these concepts, critical race theory today is concerned not only with racial discrimination but 
also with other forms of prejudice and discrimination, such as ageism, homophobia, sexism, and xenophobia. 
Critical race theory thinkers refer to this as “intersectionality,” a notion that the core attributes of an individual 
such as “race, sex, class, national origin, and sexual orientation... can be separate disadvantaging factors” 
(Delgado and Stefancic 2017, 58–59). 
Delgado and Stefancic (Ibid., 20–24) further posit that the proponents of critical race theory consist of 
two camps, which respectively offer different practical implications, namely the “idealists” and the “realists.” 
The idealists hold that “racism and discrimination are matters of thinking, mental categorization, attitude, 
and discourse... [h]ence the effective methods to counter them are changing the system of images, words, 
attitudes, unconscious feelings, scripts and social teachings” that convey intolerance and prejudice (Ibid., 
20–21). On the other hand, the realists believe that “racism is much more than a collection of unfavorable 
impressions of members of other groups (Ibid., 21),” but it has a lot to do with power and economic interests. 
They argue that racial hierarchies determine who gets tangible benefits and are deeply rooted in economic 
structure; hence, racism can only be abated by changing the racially informed class hierarchy. Anti-hate 
speech activism examined in this article is in alignment with the idealist strand of the critical race theory.
4. RECENT OUTBREAK OF HATE SPEECH IN JAPAN
Incidences of hate speech in Japan targeting resident Koreans exploded around 2012 amid Japan’s 
deteriorating relationship with South Korea, sparked off among others by the Korean president’s sojourn on 
the Liancourt Rocks,4 a collection of small islands in the Sea of Japan that has been a source of territorial 
disputes between the two nations (Deutsche Well 2013; Sato 2013).
In addition to international problems, the visit led to increased racist demonstrations in Japan. A report 
commissioned by the Ministry of Justice (the Center for Human Rights Education and Training 2016) suggests 
that from April 2012 to September 2015 the demonstrations involving hate speech occurred 1,152 times, an 
annual average of 329 for the period, or nearly once a day. 
3 NAACP (the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People) is a civil rights organization in the United 
States, founded in 1909. In Brown v. Board of Education, NAACP’s team of attorneys represented the plaintiff.  
4 The Liancourt Rocks are known as Dokdo in Korean, and Takeshima in Japanese (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-19207086).
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A report prepared by the Korean Residents Union in Japan (2014) describes the sudden rise of anti-
Korean discriminations as follows.
   
After the visit of President Lee Myung-bak to Dokdo (Takeshima) in August 2012, anti-Korean 
demonstrations intensified, and hate speech demonstrations with highly incendiary ethnically-
discriminatory language began to occur frequently in areas with large concentrations of Korean 
residents, such as Shin-Okubo in Tokyo and Tsuruhashi in Osaka.
At the same time, the boom in the Korean influence on pop culture was attacked, and the 
contentious issues surrounding comfort women, territorial disputes, and history education were 
used to further exacerbate ethnically discriminatory language and behavior against ‘anti-Japanese’ 
Koreans. This was especially the case with the flagrantly hate-filled injunction, ‘Kill them!’ directed 
at Koreans, being heard more frequently. 
Their hate rallies, in which they use megaphones in busy shopping districts to spew their 
anger, wave the Rising Sun ensign flag that conjures up images of pre-WWII Japanese militarism, 
and stir up hatred, threaten the lifestyles and safety of Korean residents in Japan, and have a 
particularly bad effect on children. This is a worsening social problem in Japan. There have even 
been voices within the Japanese Diet raising concern for this intensifying discrimination and calling 
for legal restrictions, but in reality, this situation continues to remain unaddressed.
5. RACIST DEMONSTRATIONS AND ANTI-HATE SPEECH ACTIVISM
5.1 Anti-Korean Group: Zaitokukai
Anti-Korean demonstrations in 2012–15 were mainly spearheaded by fringe right-wing groups that have 
been around in Japan for some time. Their agenda typically consists of the common staple of ultra-nationalist 
discourse such as the advocacy of national interests and dignity, onslaught on communists and leftists, 
strong condemnation of Russia, China, North and South Korea as well as, occasionally, the US. However, 
one group stood out among them as it exclusively targets long-term Korean residents of Japan, generally 
referred to as Zainichi (or Zainichi Koreans in English),5 and alleges the latter of taking advantage of Japan’s 
welfare and tax system on account of the special permanent residence status granted to them. The group, 
known as Zaitokukai (an abbreviation of “Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai,” 在日特権を許さな
い市民の会, “the Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of Zainichi”), was founded in 2007 
with the express purpose of abolishing the so-called Special Act on Immigration Control which grants ethnic 
Koreans in Japan special permanent resident status that has hardly ever been conferred on other foreign 
individuals (Penney 2012; Shibuichi 2015; Yasuda 2015). 
While officially claiming that its ultimate goal is simply to repeal an unfair legislation, in reality the group 
has primarily focused on organizing aggressive, and oftentimes violent, xenophobic rallies fraught with hate 
speech and racist slurs primarily targeting Zainichi Koreans. 
According to the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (2013), “Zaitokukai has been holding 
its anti-Korean marches in ‘Shin-Okubo Koreatown’ since 2012,” and the group’s protest started in August 
2012 “with about five hundred members marching through the streets of the neighborhood, displaying the... 
militaristic... ‘kyokujitsuki’ (rising-sun flag), and chant[ing] such slogans as ‘Kankokujin wa kaere’ (South 
Koreans go home) and ‘Chōsenjin wa dete yuke!’ (Koreans get out)." 
5 Zainichi literally means “Japan resident,” short for Zainichi Chōsenjin (Japan’s resident Koreans).
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5.2 Anti-Korean Incidents
5.2.1 Attacks on Kyoto Korean Primary School
Shortly before the hate-speech outbreak of 2012–15, in December 2009, Zaitokukai members stormed the 
Kyoto Chōsen Dai-ichi Primary School, a school operated by a pro-North Korean organization (Chongryon). 
Tokunaga (2011) recounts that in this incident the demonstrators shouted flagrantly hate-filled injunction 
through loud speakers during the school hours. They accused the school of illegally occupying a nearby 
public park. The students were terrified and many of them started crying openly, fearing for their lives. The 
Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (2013) points out that “[m]embers of the police, who were 
present at that time, simply observed the incident and did not do anything,” and “[t]he school filed a criminal 
complaint against Zaitokukai on 21 December 2009.” 
According to the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (2013), a few weeks after the incident, 
“Zaitokukai organized another hate speech demonstration against the school and the resident Koreans 
using loudspeakers on the street in front of the school... ignor[ing] a court order to stop the acts of assault 
and defamation... Four members of Zaitokukai who played the main role in organizing these actions were 
arrested and prosecuted in August 2010. The court convicted the four members on 21 April 2011 for forcible 
obstruction of business, destruction of property and defamation of the school. The court decision, however, 
did not consider the racist ideas and motivations or hate speech against a specific group of people” as the 
Hate Speech Elimination Act had not come into force yet.
The Center (Ibid.) further notes that “[t]he school filed a damage suit against Zaitokukai on 28 June 
2010 demanding compensation for the damage suffered and still being suffered. On 7 October 2013, the 
Kyoto District Court banned the Zaitokukai from ‘demonstrating near a pro- Pyongyang elementary school[’]... 
ruling that the group’s words blared through sound trucks were ‘extremely insulting and discriminatory.’” 
Additionally, “[t]he court also ordered Zaitokukai to pay about ‘12.26 million yen ($126,400)’ in damages,” and 
“clearly stated in its judgment that Zaitokukai’s activities constituted a violation of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that Japan has been ratified.”
While the incident had taken place before the hate-speech outbreak of 2012–15, it was quite impactful 
as pointed out by legal scholar Hatano (2019, 233) that “[t]he Kyoto Korean School cases and their progeny, 
intertwined with the social movement against hate speech and racism, are said to help the development of ... 
anti-hate speech policies and legislation.”
5.2.2 Anti-Korean Death-Threats by an Underage Girl
On February 24, 2012, an anti-Korean rally was organized in Osaka by a number of right wing groups 
including Zaitokukai, and a fourteen-year old Japanese girl gave a harrowing speech expressing her hatred 
of Koreans (Hatano 2019, Kendall 2013, Penney 2013). Kendall (2013) notes that “[a]mid cheers of support 
from members of her own group, the girl goes on to state her desire to kill the ‘piece of crap’ Koreans living in 
the area, threatening a repeat of the Nanking Massacre in response to the Koreans’ ‘arrogance.’” 
The video, which was uploaded on YouTube, clearly shows that “the young speaker repeatedly warns 
Koreans to return to their own country before the anger of the Japanese becomes so great that they are killed 
(Ibid.).” The footage, which also reveals that “the girl’s cries of ‘go home’ and ‘this is not your country’ are met 
with cheers from men and women off-camera (Ibid),” went viral on the Internet and “widely reported in South 
Korea and China” (McCurry 2013). 
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5.3 Counter Racist Action Collective (CRAC)
Amid a growing trend of anti-Korean demonstrations by right-wing organizations, a new kind of counter-racist 
activism was born. The embryo of the movement came into existence after the great earthquake of 2011, 
when a number of social activists who were protesting against a variety of political issues such as nuclear 
power plants and constitutional amendment began organizing counter-demonstrations.6 In September 2013 
the Counter Racist Action Collective (CRAC), or in Japanese Tai-Reishisuto Kōdō Shūdan (対レイシス
ト行動集団) was formed. According to its website, CRAC provides “a platform for those who are going to 
carry out various anti-racism action such as street protest, speech, photograph, art, music, petitions, lobbying, 
events, workshop and so on” (CRAC 2019). Resolving to oppose discrimination on all levels, the group is 
often at odds with the police and the government. Maher (2015) explains, “[CRAC] members are frequently 
arrested by the police during demonstrations, despite operating under a total non-violence policy. When they 
are not being detained by the authorities, they are subject to government-approved house searches in order 
to ascertain their motives and movements.” A CRAC member interviewed by Maher believed that the group’s 
style of protest, in which two groups of citizens confront each other, was very rare and in fact unprecedented 
in Japan.
A Japan Times article (Harlan 2013) recounts a Koreatown resident’s somewhat ambivalent feelings 
toward CRAC as follows.
“The first time Ryu [a Koreatown resident] heard the anti-Korean protesters marching on 
a main street below her office, she was angry enough to think about heaving wooden furniture 
through her fourth-floor window. But lately, she’s stayed calmer and has tried to think about the 25 
Japanese staff members she employs” (Ibid.).     
“’I know they are kind-hearted said Ryu,’ who moved to Japan 18 years ago and obtained 
legal residency . . . ” (Ibid.). 
“Since early this year [2013], a new movement has emerged to reinforce this view. When 
the ultranationalists gather in Shin-Okubo, another group—a loosely organized mix of Japanese 
citizens and activists—gathers on the other side of the street. They jeer at the ultranationalists and 
use air horns to drown out their chants” (Ibid.). 
“‘You’re a Japanese shame!’ one woman shouted to them during a recent gathering. ‘Stop the 
racism!’ another said” (Ibid.).
“The clashes have sometimes turned violent. In July, several members from both groups were 
arrested after they began spitting at one another and trading punches” (Ibid.).
“The counter-protesters have barely been mentioned in the South Korean media, but for 
many ethnic Koreans living in Shin-Okubo, they more accurately reflect Japanese sentiment. In 
some cases, the hundred or so anti-Korean protesters have been well outnumbered, according to 
videos of the protests, and the police try to keep the groups separate” (Ibid.).
“Ryu has seen this, too, from her window. The clashes make her uneasy, she said, but added, 
‘Somebody is standing up for us when we can’t. So yes, they make me appreciative’” (Ibid.).7
Yasumichi Noma (Lite-ra 2014), the founder of the group, explained in an interview that the adoption of 
inflammatory, aggressive tactics is by design. He argued that “in order to adequately combat the racist rallies 
that give the finger to the residents and hurl such abusive phrases as ‘expel all Zainichi Koreans from Japan,’ 
we have no choice, but to use equally offensive chants such as ‘go home, bigots,’ ‘you racist pigs are a big 
6 For general information on anti-racism movements in Japan today, see Akedo et al. (2015). Penney (2012) notes that in the 
first months of 2013, as Zaitokukai’s vile rhetoric was escalating, anti-racist protesters and flash mobs began to show up regularly 
on many of the group’s rallies, chanting counter slogans such as “Racists Go Home,” “Go Crawl Back to the Net.”
7 Emphasis author’s.
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disgrace,’ or simply, ‘go home you piece of crap,’ etc.”. He then went on to argue that “some may accuse us 
of resorting to equally abusive hate speech, but please understand that our intent is not to hurt anyone but 
to stop their spiteful words.”
CRAC’s militant attitude, however, has occasioned a number of violent incidents in which its members 
clashed with right wing group demonstrators and were taken into custody by the police.8 CRAC’s provocative 
methods have also elicited scathing criticisms.9 A Newsweek-Japan article (Fukada 2014) titled “Han-sabetsu 
to iu sabetsu ga bōsō suru” (discrimination in the name of “anti-discrimination” running wild) is highly critical 
of CRAC’s methods and maintains that while Zaitokukai demonstrators have been severely outnumbered, 
CRAC’s judgmental language is reminiscent of what American conservative writer Andrew Sullivan refers to 
as the gay movement’s “ugly intolerance,” a fanaticism that is “intimidating [to] the free speech of others,” and 
is “no better than the anti-gay bullies who came before us.”
Sociologists Kitada (Kitada et al. 2016) and Oguma (Oguma et al. 2016) refer to CRAC as a “post-
311 citizen movement,”10 which they believe is significantly different from the past social activisms such as 
the anti-security treaty (han-anpo) rallies of the 1960s. Unlike the latter that was driven by conventional 
leftist political parties and activists, the former is dominated by recently set up networks of citizens without 
distinguishing their political affiliations. Active participants in the anti-hate speech movement involve not only 
liberal and leftist activists, but also right-wing organization members.      
5.4 Anti-Hate Speech Network and “March on Tokyo for Freedom”
Unlike CRAC that prioritizes counter protests targeting racist rallies, Norikoe Net (のりこえねっと, 
International Network for Overcoming Hate Speech and Racism) is a loosely organized network of academics, 
activists, artists, lawyers, legislators, writers, and regular citizens, which focuses on the dissemination of 
information and networking for curbing hate speech and racism in Japan and beyond. Shibuichi (2016) 
points out that many of Norikoe Net representatives are well-known leftist elites or liberal/progressive opinion 
leaders in Japan.
Through its website (http://norikoenet.jp//), the group offers information on issues related to hate-
speech such as racial slurs, forced adaptation, ethnic minorities, freedom of speech, and so forth, in the form 
of video footage of lectures, discussions, and talk shows.
The network’s founding in 2013 was closely related to an event called the “March on Tokyo for Freedom,” 
organized by scores of citizen groups condemning hate speech and discrimination. The march, which was 
also meant to commemorate Dr. Martin Luther King’s “March on Washington” fifty years ago, took place on 
September 22, 2013, and was attended by 3000 people from various walks of life, epitomizing the very first 
mass denunciation of hate speech and racism in Japan. Norikoe Net was founded three days after the event, 
on September 25, 2013, with an explicit intent to enact an anti-hate speech law (Mainichi Shinbun 2013). 
The “March on Tokyo for Freedom” was repeated in November 2014 and November 2015, each involving 
approximately 2800 citizens from various backgrounds (Labornet Japan 2014). These rallies typically feature 
carnival like musical performances, dances, marching bands, while the participants hold signs reading, “Let’s 
be friends!” “No H8 (hate)!” etc., drawing massive attention from the onlookers along the roadsides.
8 See Fackler (2013) and Nihon Keizai Shinbun Digital (2013) for violent incidents involving CRAC members.
9 For diverse detractors of CRAC’s methods, ranging from the mainstream media to liberal leftists, see Shibuichi (2016).
10 311 is a reference to the great earthquake that hit Japan on March 11, 2011.
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6. U.N. RECOMMENDATIONS AND HATE SPEECH ELIMINATION ACT OF 2016
According to The Japan Times (Murai 2016), “In August 2014, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination urged Japan to take ‘appropriate steps to revise its legislation’ with penal sanctions to address 
the spread of hate speech against minority groups, particularly Korean residents in Japan.” The Committee 
noted in its recommendation that “hate speech and other behavior inciting racist violence and hatred during 
rallies and in the media, including the Internet, are ‘not always properly investigated and prosecuted’ by 
Japanese authorities” (Japan Times 2016).
Based upon these considerations, the Committee insisted that Japan “take appropriate measures to: 
(a) firmly address manifestations of hate and racism as well as incitement to racist violence and hatred during 
rallies; (b) take appropriate steps to combat hate speech in media including the Internet; (c) investigate and, 
where appropriate, prosecute private individuals as well as organizations responsible for such acts; (d) pursue 
appropriate sanctions against public officials and politicians who disseminate hate speech and incitement 
to hatred; and (e) address the root causes of racist hate speech and strengthen measures of teaching, 
education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination 
and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and among racial or ethnic groups” 
(the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2014).
The external pressure from the United Nations had a significant impact on the Japanese government. 
Hatano (2019, 269) points out that “[a]ccording to... an officer of the Human Rights Protection Bureau within 
the Ministry of Justice, the recognition of the rampant situation with hate and anti-hate speech rallies and the 
fact that the UN has been applying pressure on Japan seem to have been one of the factors for the change in 
government attitude.” As a result, “[t]he ministry subsequently began campaigning to raise public awareness 
of issues surrounding hate speech through such means as posters and online advertisements” (Murai 2016). 
All this eventually paved the way for the enactment of Japan’s very first hate-speech restriction law. 
On May 24, 2016, the Hate Speech Elimination Act of 2016 was passed by the Parliament, opening up a new 
chapter in Japan’s long overdue efforts to restrain racism and discrimination.11  
While the legislation was generally welcomed as “the first such law in a country that [had] long failed 
to tackle the issue of racism despite its membership in the U.N.-designated International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” (Osaki 2016), detractors denigrated it as “ineffective” (Ibid.). 
This is due to the fact that while the law “condemns unjust discriminatory language as ‘unforgivable,’ it does 
not legally ban hate speech and sets no penalty” (Ibid.). Experts also emphasize that “the law is only intended 
to cover people of overseas origin and their descendants who live legally in Japan” (Ibid.), which means it 
“excludes many foreign residents without valid visas, such as asylum seekers and over-stayers” (Ibid.).
The law, however, has been effective in encouraging Japan’s municipalities, especially those with a 
large ethnic Korean population, to enforce ordinances aiming to curb hate speech and discrimination. In May 
2016, Kawasaki, a city with a sizable ethnic Korean community, “prohibited rally organizers from using a park, 
citing the need to protect citizens from verbal abuse” (Japan Times 2017), and “became the first municipality 
in the country to take such a measure” (Ibid.). In July 2016, two months after the passing of the anti-hate 
speech law, in the city of Osaka, another municipality with a large ethnic Korean concentration, “Japan’s 
first ordinance aimed at deterring... hate speech went into effect” (Johnston 2016). All in all, according to 
Japan’s National Police Agency, “[t]he number of xenophobic rallies in which ultra-right-wing groups use 
11 The complete title of the law is「本邦外出身者に対する不当な差別的言動の解消に向けた取組の推進に
関する法律」 (The law for promoting measures to eliminate unjust discriminatory speech and action against the people of 
foreign origin), Law No. 68/2016.
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discriminatory language has dropped by nearly half in the 11 months since the Diet enacted a law to deter 
hate speech” (Japan Times 2017).
Two years after the anti-hate speech act had come into force, however, the U.N. Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination again called for “the strengthening of the hate speech elimination law 
that came into force in Japan in 2016, as discrimination against ethnic minorities persists in the country” 
(Japan Times 2018). Marc Bossuyt, a committee member and country rapporteur for Japan, “commended as 
positive the entry into force of the Hate Speech Elimination Act in 2016” (the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination n.d.), but pointed out that the law “had some defects, such as limitation to citizens of 
foreign origin only” (Ibid.), and “appeared to have only very limited effects as a remedy for minorities in Japan” 
(Ibid.); therefore, further amendment is needed. 
In June 2019, marking the third anniversary of the law, Asahi Shinbun (2019) ran an editorial assessing 
its benefits and shortcomings. The editor points out multiple drawbacks: (1) the Internet is still awash with 
anonymous discriminatory comments and expressions; (2) hateful arguments are used during the election 
campaigns, and (3) vicious fake news surfaces in the wake of natural disasters, accusing members of the 
minority committing crime. The editor nevertheless believes “the law has produced significant effects (Ibid.),” 
namely: (1) the court has become more proactive in dealing with hate-speech related cases, banning rallies 
potentially promoting hatred or ordering website operators allowing discriminatory posts to pay compensation; 
(2) the law has changed the government, the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies’ stance toward 
hate speech, emboldened them to take a firm action; and (3) a number of municipal governments including 
Kawasaki, Osaka, and Tokyo have issued an ordinance to restrict the use of public facilities for hate rallies.
    
7. CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND JAPAN: SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
In Japan, the term “critical race theory” has been translated as hihanteki jinshu riron (批判的人種理論), 
and generally regarded as “a radical legal movement that aims to transform the relationship among race, 
law and power” or “[a] reform movement within the legal profession, particularly within academia, whose 
adherents believe that the legal system has disempowered minorities” (Higaki 2017).
While academic discussions on critical race theory in Japan have predominantly focused on legal 
perspectives relating to hate speech regulations, there are a few studies offering sociological implications 
of critical race theory in the Japanese context, including ones that deal with recent outbreaks of anti-Korean 
hate speech.
7.1 Levin: “Whiteness” of Japan’s Ethnic Majority 
Levin (2008)12 posits that Japan’s ethnic majority, Wajin,13 are culturally, socially, and legally endowed with 
what critical race theorists term the “whiteness” of white people in the United States, i.e. “a vast range 
of social privileges and an intricately related but separate experience described as transparency” (Ibid.). 
Privilege here refers to the benefits experienced by the majority such as whites in the United States as a 
result of their advantaged position, especially their ability to live without experiencing discrimination (Ibid.). 
Transparency means “the ability of whites to live without recognizing race as a fundamental operating actor 
and without examining the impact of race (including race-based privilege) upon their life experiences” (Ibid.). 
12 Unofficial English translation is accessible at https://www.law.hawaii.edu/sites/www.law.hawaii.edu/files/content/
events/19765/Levin.Wajin%27s_Whiteness.Horitsu_Jiho_Feb._2008.English.pdf.
13 Literally means the Japanese, Wajin is a classic term referring to the Japanese as an ethnic group. The term is widely 
used by the Ainu to distinguish them from Japan’s ethnic majority.
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Levin argues that unlike the minority groups in Japan such as Burakumin, ethnic Koreans, Ryukyu/
Okinawan Islanders, Nikkei communities, and other Asian communities, Japan’s ethnic majority are not 
subjected to discrimination and prejudices. Furthermore, through Modern Japan’s mainstream racial discourse 
famously presenting a false myth of homogeneity of a single Japanese race, the existence of minorities as 
such is obscured; thereby, the transparency of the dominant majority is almost perfectly achieved. In order to 
amend these ongoing racial inequalities, Levin contends, Japan’s ethnic majority must first become cognizant 
of the minorities’ predicament as well as their own privileges. 
7.2 Arudou: Embedded Racism and Visible Minorities 
Arudou (2015) maintains that previous studies of Japan’s minorities have disproportionately focused on 
“invisible minorities,” i.e. historical under-caste Burakumin, ethnic Koreans, the Ainu and Okinawan indigenous 
peoples, who are “generally of ‘Asian’ roots and can ‘pass’ as ‘Japanese’ in many social interactions” (Ibid., 
695). In his view, “[t]his approach... results in hundreds of thousands of people living in Japan, including 
Japanese citizens, being overlooked or omitted from studies of racism in Japan” (Ibid., 699). To use Arudou’s 
term, they are “visible minorities,” i.e. “people on first glance may not look . . . [Japanese] in terms of physical 
appearance and ‘visual identification’” (Ibid., 701). He further notes that “‘[v]isible [m]inorities’ are residents 
of Japan who are visually identified as not ‘looking Japanese’ (e.g., Subcontinental Indians, the African 
Diaspora, Caucasians, Middle-Easterners, non-Nikkei South Americans, some South Asians etc.), and are 
thus treated as ‘not Japanese’” (Ibid., 701-702). 
Arudou (Ibid., 703) contends that this oversight has “deleterious effects on otherwise sound research 
on racism and minorities in Japan” as there have been a number of cases involving blatant discrimination 
against visible minorities at a public facility such as a hot spring bathhouse and a jewelry store. 
Arudou (Ibid., 723) concludes, drawing upon the concept of “Embedded Racism inspired by Critical 
Race Theory,” that racial discrimination based on one’s appearance exists in Japan “despite the claims that 
‘homogeneous, monoethnic Japan’ has no ‘races,’ therefore no racial discrimination.”
7.3 Higaki: Japan’s Unawareness of Racial Inequalities
Higaki (2010; 2011; 2017) provides an extensive introduction to critical race theory in Japanese and analyzes 
in detail how it has featured in American case law jurisprudence. According to Higaki (2011; 2017), the theory 
was introduced to Japan in the late 1990s, but since then there has been no comprehensive discussion of 
it in Japanese, except for a number of articles citing it as an example of legal arguments advocating hate 
speech restriction.
Believing that hate speech restriction is feasible without infringing upon the right to free speech in the 
Japanese constitution, Higaki (2019) holds that critical race theory offers a thought provoking argument for 
Japan. He agrees with Levin (2008) that in Japan there is a double transparency of racial inequalities, i.e. 
(1) the ethnic majority’s unawareness of their privileges; and (2) the general public’s lack of mindfulness of 
the presence of racial and ethnic minorities due to the pervasive nature of the homogeneous nation myth 
prevalent in Japan. As an example of this, Higaki (2017) quotes a Japanese constitutional law professor, who 
states that “since there is no racial differences among the Japanese, racial discrimination has never posed a 
serious problem for Japan.” Due to this double unawareness, Higaki (Ibid.) believes that the majority ethnic 
group’s transparency in Japan is even “more serious than in America.” 
From a legal point of view, Higaki (Ibid.) believes that in order to enact an effective restriction of hateful 
expressions in Japan, a clear definition of hate speech is needed, for which one needs to first understand both 
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historical and present-day contexts of racial and ethnic discrimination and investigate the actual conditions of 
discriminatory speech going on in the country. 
7.4 Shiohara: Hate Speech and a Sociology of ‘Vulnerability’
With the emergence in Japan—especially among young people who do not necessarily approve of hate 
speech—of an ‘atmosphere’ to tolerate and condone hateful expressions against ethnic Koreans and other 
minorities, Shiohara (2013; 2017)14 in his article titled “Heito supīchi to ‘kizutsukiyasusa’ no shakaigaku” (ヘ
イトスピーチと「傷つきやすさ」の社会学, hate speech and a sociology of “vulnerability”) sheds 
light on the sociological factors contributing to the climate. Drawing upon critical race theory, he suggests that 
one of the mechanisms that perpetuate racial inequalities is the inculcation of a strong sense of “vulnerability” 
into minority individuals. 
To use Shiohara’s words, a sense of vulnerability is excessively “internalized” and “embodied” by the 
minorities so that it is extremely difficult for the majority to accurately understand the minority’s plight. This 
in turn creates an irrevocable gap between the minority and the majority, so when a society is undergoing 
fundamental changes such as rapid globalization, and the majority are beginning to feel increasingly 
“vulnerable,” the minorities will become an easy target of the majority’s condemnation on account of their 
“unjust privileges.” In his view, this replicates hate groups such as Zaitokukai, whose allegation that ethnic 
Koreans enjoy undeserved “entitlements” is largely unsubstantiated. 
Shiohara continues that the majoritarian groups’ demand for redress for the “unjust” system is 
fundamentally flawed as it is based on a unilateral assumption that only the majority can rightfully determine 
the fairness of the system. By excluding the minorities—the concerned parties—from the decision-making 
process, these groups are going against the very principle of deliberative democracy.  
Finally, echoing critical race theory’s advocacy of hate speech regulation, Shiohara argues that while 
many legal scholars in Japan are unfavorable to any hate speech restriction, as the existence of minorities 
as such is hardly recognized and accepted in Japan, a non-interfering approach will inevitably deprive 
the minorities’ right to free speech. In this sense, he believes that, multiple shortcomings notwithstanding, 
recently enacted anti-hate speech law is a significant development in remedying the injustices faced by 
ethnic Koreans and other minorities, and to start building a new relationship between these minorities and 
the dominant society.
8. CONCLUSION
A brief examination of recent research concerning the sociological implications of critical race theory in Japan 
reveals that the notion of transparency or unawareness of racial injustices, as well as that of the existence 
of ethnic minorities per se, has featured prominently in these studies. This in turn highlights their emphasis 
on one of the major tenets of critical race theory, i.e. social constructionism, a notion that racial and ethnic 
discrimination is occasioned by systemic and structural forces.
Shiohara (Ibid.), who specifically alludes to the recent outbreak of hate speech against ethnic Koreans, 
describes these societal forces as the process of the minority being forced by the dominant society to 
internalize and embody excessive vulnerability, which is subsequently exploited by the majority as an easy 
target of hateful expressions.
14 The article (2013) was originally published online, and later included in a collection of his essays (2017) with additional 
sections.
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Informed by such observation, their discourse unanimously emphasizes that in order to achieve more 
equal racial relationships in Japan, it is essential that the Japanese public become cognizant of the presence 
and the predicament of ethnic minorities in the country. In addition, this brings to the fore the significance 
of the anti-hate speech movements emerging in Japan in the last few years. Some of their methods and 
approaches might have raised a few concerns, but it is undeniable that they have awakened the public to the 
harsh realities of ongoing hate speech.
Anti-hate speech movements as represented by newly emerging citizen activism such as CRAC and 
Norikoe Net, along with a timely external pressure exercised by a UN Committee, have all been a factor for 
the passing of the very first anti-hate speech act, a historical event that marks Japan’s transition from the 
minimalist to the regulationist position with regard to hate speech restriction. 
Japan’s seemingly abrupt position shift indicates the relevance of another critical race theory concept, 
i.e. interest convergence, a notion that unforeseen significant changes can occur when the majority’s and 
the minority’s interests converge. It is well documented that as early as in 2014, Tokyo’s decision to host 
the Olympic Games in 2020 impacted bureaucrats, legislators, and politicians as they were “coming under 
pressure to rein in the verbal abuse and outright hate speech directed at non-Japanese people, chiefly 
Koreans” (Economist 2014). Mounting needs to improve Japan’s image ahead of a momentous international 
event undoubtedly precipitated the passing of the landmark hate speech elimination law. Furthermore, in 
October 2018, the Tokyo metropolitan government complied with the Olympic Charter and adopted the 
ordinance restricting individuals and organizations from using public space to engage in hate speech against 
ethnic and sexual minorities (Asahi Shinbun 2018b). 
All this shows that interest convergence is not only an analytical concept to understand the political 
dynamics that precipitated consequential social changes, but also a strategic tool that enables individuals 
and groups advocating for change to identify and capitalize on the majority’s crucial interests and promote 
remedial measures for disenfranchised members of society.  
It should also be noted, however, that critical race theory has yet to generate any impact on the 
Japanese legal system as the recently enacted Hate Speech Elimination Act was more of a result of growing 
anti-racist movements, an opportune external pressure, and interest convergence. The theory, nevertheless, 
has featured prominently in recent legal and sociological discourse that seeks to understand the social 
dynamics behind the dramatic rise of anti-Korean hate speech in Japan.  
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